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ABSTRACT
This paper constru cts a very simple model to investig ate the effects of
the intergen erationa l distribu tion of rents on saving, growth and fiscal
policy. The rents in this model are generate d from an investme nt externa lity.
We conside r a model in which the populati on grows at a constant rate, with new
generati ons unrelate d to previous ones. The model consider ed can have
sustaine d growth in output per capita or can converge to a steady- state,
dependin g on paramet er values. The distribu tion of rents between labor and
owners of firms affects the rate of growth in both cases.

In searching for explanations of the productivity slowdown in the U.S. in
recent decades, Romer (1987) notes that there appears to be a large difference
between the effects on output of adding a unit of capital (or labor), and
capital's (or labor's) share in national income.

The returns to factors do

not reflect their marginal productivity, but instead may largely be determined
by the share of external rents captured by the factors.

The implications of

various investment externalities for growth have, of course, been studied in
great detail in recent years.

However, we argue that the distribution of

rents per se will have important effects in determining the growth path of the
economy.

In turn, the potential tradeoffs between growth and distributional

goals are paramount in fiscal policy decisions.

Indeed, the history of fiscal

policy in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s appears to be one predicated on the
conflict between groups trying to maintain their economic status in the face
of real changes in the economy.

Important changes in budgetary and tax policy

have evolved in response to shocks to the economy which have led to a
redistribution of returns to various groups.

But there is a strong

interdependence between the distributional goals of fiscal policy and the
dynamic goals for saving, investment and growth.
The recent literature (Romer (1986, 1987), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
for example) provides a useful starting point for investigating these issues.
It has suggested that there are important external effects of investment.

For

example, if one firm increases expenditure on research and development, it is
unlikely to be able to capture fully the social benefit of that investment.
There is likely to be a positive spillover to other firms in the industry and
1

in other sectors of the economy.
spillover s.

Our focus is on the rents derived from the

In the absence of first-ord er debt neutralit y, the distribut ion

of the rents have an influence on the dynamic behavior of the economy.

The

level of aggregate consumpti on and the rates of capital accumula tion and
income growth depend on how the external rents are distribut ed.
In this paper, we will demonstra te in a simple example economy how the
distribut ion affects these macro aggregate s over time, and how the effects of
fiscal policy depend on the distribut ion of the rents.

Our goal in part is to

develop a set of predictio ns from the model that might be tested, and would
ultimatel y refine our understan ding of the nature of economic growth.
In the existing literature , there has been little focus on the
distribut ional effects of the growth externali ty.

The bulk of the literatur e

is set in a context of a single represent ative consumer.
that type of model how the external rents are distribut ed.

It is irrelevan t in
More recently,

Saint-Pau l (1992) and Alogoskou fis and van der Ploeg (1991) have examined
overlappi ng-genera tions models with investmen t externali ties, but ones in
which all of the external rents accrue to labor.

Thus, the distribut ion issue

does not arise in their models by assumptio n.
Perotti (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1991) have looked at the effect
of the intragene rational size distribut ion of income on growth.

Alesina and

Rodrik (1991) and Bertola (1991) have focused on the intragene rational
distribut ion of factor rewards.

In contrast, we study the intergene rational

distribut ion of external rents.
The extent to which each group captures these rents will decide the
choice of fiscal policy for a governmen t maximizin g some social welfare
function.

In the presence of an investmen t externali ty such as the one
2

described, a Pigouvian subsidy to investment can lead to a Pareto improvement
in welfare.

Even with such a subsidy in place, the government may wish to

pursue goals that involve redistribution across generations. 1

Many of the

issues that are raised in public debate concerning fiscal policy are not
matters that involve policies that raise everybody's welfare.

A policy that

raises national saving usually redistributes from current (particularly older)
generations towards future generations.

I. The Model

The model used in this paper is an overlapping generations of the Weil
(1989) type.

There is constant proportional population growth.

have infinite horizons, and perfect foresight.

Individuals

All agents are endowed with

identical human capital when they are born, and they have identical
preferences.

We aggregate the equations describing the behavior of optimizing

individuals to obtain the dynamic behavior of the economy.

(This contrasts

with the older literature on optimal growth models with population growth,
which studied the path for the economy when a social planner maximized per
capita utility.)

It is assumed that no individual's welfare depends directly

on the utility of any other individual (i.e., no operative bequest motive).
This type of model shares many of the characteristics of other
overlapping generations models.

(In fact, algebraically, it is essentially

identical to the Blanchard (1985) model.)
sum taxes matters.

In particular, the timing of lump

If taxes are deferred to later, unborn generations will

1 In the model we use, lump-sum redistributive fiscal policy cannot, in
itself, improve everybody's welfare.
3

bear a larger share.

Thus, government surpluses and deficits redistribute the

tax burden between generations.

Indeed, Buiter and Kletzer (1990) have shown

that in overlapping-generations models any equilibrium generated by a
particular sequence of budget deficits (or surpluses) and age dependent lump
sum taxes or transfers can be replicated by some other sequence of budget
deficits (or surpluses) and only age independent lump-sum taxes or transfers.
In this section, we will begin by describing the consumers' optimization
problems.

Then, we will turn to the firm.

Finally, we will set up the

dynamic model in terms of aggregates.
Our notation convention in this paper is that variables pertaining to
individual consumers or firms are in small letters, aggregate variables are in
capital letters with a~ over them, and aggregate per capita variables are in
capital letters.

Consumers
Individuals are assumed to have logarithmic utility and maximize utility
over an infinite horizon.

The dynamic budget constraint faced by an

individual at time t who was born at time vis
a(v,t) = r·a(v,t) + w(t) - T(t) - c(v,t).
The individual also faces the lifetime constraint
lim a(v,t)e

-rt

=O.

t~

Finally, we assume that a(v,v) = 0.
In the above equations, a(v,t) is the assets held by the individual at
w(t) is the wage paid at time t.

time t, and c(v,t) is her consumption.

that it is independent of the individual's age.

4

Note

T(t) are lump-sum taxes (or

transfers if negative).

We also assume that these are independent of age.

Given the result of Buiter and Kletzer cited above, we do not lose any
generality by considering only age-independent taxes and transfers, as long as
we allow government budget deficits that satisfy the conventional solvency
constraint.

Furthermore, we assume w(t) - T(t)

treat the interest rate, r, as a constant.

~

0.

Finally, note that we

It will turn out that given our

assumptions about firms' technology, the interest rate will always be
constant.
It is easy to show that the optimal consumption choice is given by
c(v,t)

=

o[a(v,t) + h(t)],

where
oo

h(t) = J [w(s)-T(s)]e

-r(s-t)

ds,

t

and o is the rate of time preference.
A crucial assumption in this framework is that agents cannot trade claims
to human capital.

We will make a distinction between assets which can be

traded (equity, bonds and capital) and those that cannot (human capital).
We assumer> o throughout.

Otherwise, in equilibrium consumers will

just consume their labor income and never save.

This is an uninteresting

case.

Firms
Turning to the firm, we assume a very specific production function.
have that the output of firm j at time tis given by

5

We

In this equation, y(j,t) refers to output by firm j at time t, k(j,t) is
that firm's capital input, and t(j,t) is that firm's labor input.
aggregate capital stock, and L(t) is the population at time t.
that labor is inelastical ly supplied.)

K(t) is the

(It is assumed

.

Note that the parameter w is different

than the wage rate, w(t).
The production function is obviously a very special one.

We chose this

function because it yields an analyticall y tractable economic system, while
capturing all of the essential elements of the problem we are interested in.
The most important aspects of this function arise from our assumption that
there are a constant number of firms in this economy, normalized to equal one.
We are assuming, then, that there is some specific factor which is available
to the firm and is not reproducible .

Hence, the firm will have a positive

value (more on this in just a moment).
identical, we have k(j,t)

= K(t),

In equilibrium ,' since all firms are

and t(j,t)

= L(t).

This implies that there

is ~n aggregate production function given by 9K(t) + wL(t).

The linearity of

the aggregate function ensures that the real interest rate is constant over
time.
This production function captures the notion that there is a positive
externality to greater investment by the firm.

The social marginal product of

capital is 9, but the private marginal product is less than 9.
Labor's private marginal product is greater than its social marginal
product, w.

The share of the externality that falls to labor (as opposed to

owners of the firm) is measured by the parameter~ .
greater the payment to labor.

6

The larger is~. the

A useful way to highlight some key features of our production function is
to contrast it to the one considered by Saint-Paul (1992) and Alogoskoufis and
van der Ploeg (1991).

They have~= 1, and w = 0.

Their first assumption

implies that labor captures all of the external benefits from the investment
externality.

Since we argue that the interesting thing about fiscal policy in

a model with investment externalities arises from the distributional effects
of the externality, we clearly do not want~ to equal one.

We assume w

* 0

because otherwise individuals' net worth at birth would be non-zero only
because of the investment externality.

If we were to consider the case in

which all the rents accrue to owners of the firm, and insisted on setting w=O,
then the: model would ha:v:e.-the ,.uncomfortable- feature that ,individuals have no
income, and thus can never save or consume.
The share of the externality that accrues to owners of the firm is given
by 1-~.

Note that the firm would have no value were it not for the

externality.

One might wish to think of firms having property rights that

allow them to exploit the externality.

It would be simple enough to enter a

linear term as we did f,or labor, so that there is a positive social return to
a specific factor such as land.

However, this would make the aggregate model

very difficult to analyze, unless the function were linear in the quantity of
the specific factor endowed to each firm divided by population.

Such a

specification seems hard to justify, and there does not seem to be any serious
7

t

I

harm done in assuming the social marginal product of the specific factor is
zero (as opposed to the analogous assumption for labor).
The firm chooses the capital stock and the labor input to maximize
profits each period.

There are no costs to installing capital, so the firm

will set the marginal product of capital equal to the rental rate:
eakCj,t) 0 - 1tCj,t)(l-a)~K(t) 1- 0[Ct)-(l-a)~ = r - p.
Here, pis the per unit of capital subsidy from the government, and is the
only distortionary tax or subsidy in the model.

In product market

equilibrium, the above condition reduces to

Ba= r

-p.

The condition that the marginal product of labor equal the wage rate is
given in equilibrium by:
e~(l-a)K(t) + w = w(t).
Note that this equation uses the aggregate per capita capital stock, K(t).
The stream of dividend payments for this firm are given by the value of
output less the cost of factor payments (plus the subsidy to capital).
Letting the price of the good be unity, we find in equilibrium that dividend
payments are given by 0(1- 0 )(1-~)K(t).
It is interesting to observe the factors that affect wages and dividends,
given the capital stock.

First, wages and dividends are higher the higher is

the externality (the greater is l- 0 ).
lower the greater is~-

Second, wages are higher and dividends

Note that dividends would be zero either if there

were no externality ( 0 =1) or all the rents went to labor (~=1).
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Financial Market Equilibrium
Before examining the aggregate system, we consider the financial market.
Because all individuals have perfect foresight, all assets must pay the same
rate of return.

This implies that the return on government debt must equal

the rental rate of capital, r.
It also means that the return to holding equities must equal r.

The rate

of return for equities is given by
r = q(t)/q(t) + 0(1-~)(l- 0 )K(t)/q(t) - P(t)/q(t).
In this expression, q represents the price per share.
share per firm.

We assume there is one

Along with the assumption of the representative firm, q can

be seen to also equal the aggregate value of shares.
on dividends are given by P(t).

Non-distortionary taxes

So, we have that the capital gains rate plus

the flow of dividends per share equals the interest rate.
We will assume dividends are always non-negative.

That is,

PCtl ~ ec1-~)Cl-alKCtl.

Aggregate Values

We assume that population grows at the constant rate n.
straightforward to aggregate as in Weil (1989).

It is

We will leave the details to

the reader.
Aggregate accumulation per capita of tradeable assets is given by
A(t) = (0 0 +p-n)A(t) + w(t) - T(t) - C(t).
Recall that the interest rate, r, equals e0 +p.
We have that A(t) = K(t) + q(t) + D(t).

9

K(t) is the aggregate per capita

capital stock, q(t) is the aggregate per capita value of shares, and D(t) is
the aggregate per capita government debt.
Consumption evolves according to
C(t) = (0 0 +p-o)C(t) - onK(t) - onq(t) - onD(t).
The evolution of equity prices is given by:
q(t) = (0 0 +p-n)q(t) - 0(1-o)(l-~)K(t) + P(t).
The government budget constraint is given by:
D(t) = (p+ 00-n)D(t) + pK(t) - T(t).
T(t) is the sum of the two types of non-distortiona ry taxes: T(t) = T(t) +
P(t).

The equation says that accumulation of debt equals interest payments on

the debt (recalling r = p + 0 0), plus subsidies to firm's for renting capital
(pK(t)) less non-distortiona ry taxes.

We also impose the government solvency

constraint:
lim D(t)e-(r-n)t = 0.
t-¾3

Taking the equations for q(t) and D(t) and subtracting them from the
equation for A(t) (and using the fact that w(t)

=

0~(l- 0 )K(t) + w) we have

K(t) = (0-n)K(t) - C + w.
The four equations for K(t), D(t), q(t) and C(t) constitute a four
equation dynamic system.

However, the system is not complete until the fiscal

policy choice is specified.

A

path for total non-distortiona ry taxes, T(t),

and for the amount of non-distortiona ry taxes that falls on dividends, P(t),
must be specified before the system is closed.

In the next two sections we

will examine the model under several different assumptions about fiscal
policy.

The variables K(t), D(t), q(t) and C(t) will constitute state

variables under all the fiscal policy regimes we consider.

For now, notice

that the K(t) and C(t) equations are not affected by the values for T(t) and
p ( t).

II.

The Laissez-Faire Economy

In this section, we will analyze the model when there are no taxes, no
transfers, and no government debt -- a laissez-faire government.

We are

interested in characterizing how capital accumulation and consumption are
affected by the distribution of rents and by the size of the externality.
When p, P(t), T(t), r(t) and D(t) all equal zero at all times, the
dynamic system can be written:

cCtl

ictJ

=

q(t)

er-o

-on

-on

C(t)

-1

e-n

0

K(t)

o

-e Cl -r) (1 -11) er-n

q (t )

0

+

w
0

Recall that we are only examining the interesting case of 0 0 -0 > 0.

A.

The Effects of Rent Distribution
In this model, because labor is supplied inelastically and the number of

firms is fixed, the share of rents accruing to each recipient does not affect
any factor supply or factor demand decision.
wealth across generations.

It only affects the supply of

The larger the share of rents that go to labor,

the smaller the wealth of currently alive generations.

When rents accrue to

labor, future generations will capture some of those rents, but when rents
accrue to firms they are captured by the current owners of the firm.

11

We will compare two economie s in which the share of rents going to labor
differ.

Each economy has the same initial capital stock.

rents are earned by labor2: ~ = 1.

In one economy, all

In the comparis on economy, infinite simally

less of the rents accrue to labor, and go to firms instead.

The choice of~=

1 as the benchma rk economy is made because it simplifi es the algebra , and is
not critica l for any of our conclusi ons.
There are three state variable s which describe the path of the economy.
K{t) is predeter mined, while C(t) and q(t) are not.

Consump tion and the value

of firms can jump to place the economy on the saddle path.
converge nce to the steady state.

There need not be

The economy proceeds along the saddle path

in both the stable and unstable cases.

When all roots are positive , the

economy is on the unstable saddle path.

The fact that the unstable solution

is feasible does not arise because of the overlapp ing generati ons nature of
the model, or because of the externa lity.
product ion function is linear.

It is because the aggrega te

Even in the represen tative agent version of

this model with no externa lity, the optimal path could be diverge nt, and
capital and labor could grow indefin itely.3

This is the case of sustaine d

growth that has received conside rable attentio n in the new growth literatu re.
We will assume that the interest rate is less than the long run growth
rate.

This assumpt ion insures that the price of equities is always positive .

In the stable case, the long-run growth rate of aggrega te output is n, so the
assumpt ion implies

0~

> n.

We actually need a stronger restrict ion on the

paramet er space than this in the unstable case because the economy grows at
2 As in the papers of Alogosk oufis
and van der Ploeg (1991) and SaintPaul (1992).
3 The model of Jones
and Manuell i (1990) is one that emphasi zes the role
of non-con cavity in producti on as a source for sustaine d growth.
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the rate A+n, where A is the value of the smallest of the characteris tic roots
of the dynamic system.

Hence, we will need that 0 0 -n-A > 0.

Our strategy will be to examine the economy near the point where n = 1.
This is convenient, because when n

= 1,

q

= o.,

and dynamic system is only 2x2

(two state variables, Kand C, and two dynamic equations). So, we will end up
dC(t)
dK(t)
evaluating derivatives like
and - - - from the 3x3 system evaluated at
ctn
ctn
n = 1. The assumption that 0 0 -n-A > 0 is accomplishe d in this case when
on+e(o-n)(l -a) >

o.

The steady-stat e values of K(t), C(t) and q(t) are denoted K, C and q.
Their values are:
Cea-o)Cea-n) w

K=-------- -----0(o+n0-00)(
00-n)+on0(1 -0)(l-n)

[on(0a-n)+o n0(1-a)Cl-n) lw

C=--- ------ -----0(o+n0-00)( 00-n)+on0(1 -0)(1-n)
e(ea-o)(l-a )(l-n)w

q=-------- -----0(o+no-0o)( 0o-n)+on0(1
-o)(l-n)

The product of the characteris tic roots (given by the determinant of the
matrix in equation (1)) is equal to minus the denominator of each of the
expressions for the steady-stat e values.

Thus, when the system is saddle-path

stable (one negative root and two positive), all of the variables are positive
in steady state.

When all roots are positive (the sustained growth case) then

all the variables are negative in steady state.
The change in the steady-stat e values for a change inn are given by:
dK
ctn

= - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > 0.
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dC

dK

= (9-n)- > 0.
d~
d~

=

[e(o+na-Ba)Cea-n)+one(l-a)Cl-~)]

When~= 1, the term in brackets in the numerator of

dq

2

is equal to minus the

d~

product of the eigenvalues of the 2x2 system.
dq

< 0, and in the unstable case

dq

> 0.

Thus, in the stable case

We will only need to evaluate this

derivative when~= 1.
There are an infinite number of dynamic paths that solve equation (1).
Only one path (in the stable and unstable cases) satisfies the feasibility
conditions for the economy that K(t) and C(t) remain positive in all time
periods.

Along this path, the variables converge to the steady state at a

rate given by A, the negative eigenvalue, if the system is stable.

If it is

unstable they diverge from the steady state at the rate A, the smaller of the
positive roots in the 2x2 system.4

We have then, that K = A(K(t)-K), or

A(K(t)-K) = -(C(t)-C) + (0-n)(K(t)-K) + w.
Differentiating (and using the fact that

dC

dK
= (9-n)-), we have

d~

dC(t)

(2)

d~

d~

dK

_ dA

d~

d~

= A- - (K(t)-K)-.

4

This is the path that satisfies the conditions: lim K(t) ~ 0, and
t-¾:>
lim K(t)e-(e-n)t ~ 0 (which comes from integrating the equation of motion for
t-¾:>
the aggregate capital stock and imposing a boundary condition). These are
necessary for a feasible infinite horizon consumption stream.
14

We need to evaluate

The characteristic polynomial for the system

given by equation (1) is:

Setting P equal to zero and differentiating allows us to calculate
evaluating the derivative at 71=1.
d;:\

d;:\

d71'

(Note that when 71=1, (0 0 -o-;:\)(0-n-;:\) =on.)

one Cl-a)
- - - - - - - - - - > 0.
Cea-n-;:\)[e-n+ea -o-2;:\]

The sign of this derivative is the positive.

From investigation of the

polynomial Pone can determine that;:\< 0-o, so recalling our assumption that
0a-n-;:\ > 0, the denominator is the product of two positive numbers.
dC(t)
We can see from equation (2) that the largest - - - can be is when
d71
K(t) = 0, because

d;:\

d71
cases.

> 0.

This is true in both the convergent and divergent

When K(t) = 0 (and evaluating the derivative at 71=1):
dC(t) = one Cl-al Cea-o)w[
;:\
1
]
e(o+na-ea)
e(o+na-Ba)Cea-n ) + Cea-n-;:\)(e-n+ea -o-2;:\)
-one(l-a)Cea-o) w[

rr+ea-n-;:\
]
< 0.
rr(ea-n)(ea-n-;:\)( rr-;:\)

= -------- ----------

rr

In this expression, rr > 0 is the largest eigenvalue of the 2x2 system when
dC(t)
11 = 1.
The largest value of
is negative.
d71

So, when more rents accrue to equity owners (71 falls below 1), currently
living generations are able to capture more of the rents.

The value of all

future rents that will be paid to owners of equities are capitalized in the
current price of equities.

The wealth of the current generations is higher

when equity holders receive some rents, and their consumption will be larger.
Comparing this economy to a benchmark economy with the same initial capital
15

stock (therefore the same output), an increase in the share of rents accruing
to equity holders lowers saving.
In the stable economy capital accumulatio n will be lower, and the long
run levels of the capital stock and consumption will be lower.

The initial

consumption is higher in the economy in which some rents accrue to equity
holders, but eventually aggregate consumption falls below what it would be in
the economy with ~=1.
In the unstable economy, growth will proceed at a slower rate in the
economy in which~ is lower (rents to labor are lower) because the per capita
capital stock and consumption are diverging from steady state at a rate A,
which rises with~-

Initial consumption is higher, but again, it must

eventually fall below that of the economy with ~=1.

We also have that q = A(q(t)-q), so that
A(q(t)-q) = (0o-n)(q(t)- q) - 0(1-o)(l-~)( K(t)-K).
Totally differentia ting, we have:

Evaluating the change in q at ~=1, the last two terms in the previous
equation drop out, so that we have
(3)

dq(t)
=

d~

dq
d~

e Cl-a)
---(K(t)-K ).

Ba-n-A

dq(t)
This equation implies that - - - achieves its largest value when K(t)
d~

equals zero, whether the economy is stable or not.
~=1)
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In this case (evaluated at

d~

=

< 0.

rr(0o-n)(0o-n-A)

So, as~ falls slightly below 1, q rises.

In the benchmark economy, q = 0,

because there is no return to holding equities.

Hence, in the comparison

economy, q will be higher than in the benchmark economy.

To summarize both the convergent and divergent cases, when more rents
accrue to firm owners, non-human wealth of current generations (K+q) is
greater, because q is greater.

Therefore, current consumption will be higher.

Since the distribution of rents does not affect aggregate output
saving will be lower as equity's share of rents rise.

(=

0K + wL),

Hence, capital

accumulation and growth will be smaller.
Thus, the growth rate of the economy depends on how rents are
distributed.

In the stable case, the steady state level of capital and

consumption will be lower when labor's share of rents is smaller, while in the
unstable case the permanent growth rate.will be smaller.

B.

Effects of the Externality on Growth
Now we will discuss the effects of the externality itself on growth.

This model is not very different from many other models with investment
externalities, except for the fact that the economy moves along a saddle path
which could be either convergent or divergent.
We will consider the effects of small externalities.

So, we will compare

an economy in which there is no externality (o=l) to one in which
slightly smaller than one.

r

is

In our economy, there are constant returns to

scale in the aggregate, no matter what the value of 0 .
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A decrease in 0

represents not only a greater externality , but a lower private marginal
product of capital as well.

We are comparing economies that have the same

aggregate technology and the same initial capital stock.

We ask how

differently the economies behave when externaliti es are relatively more
important.
From the expressions for the steady state, (and evaluating the
derivatives at r=l), we have:
dK

won

=

ctr

+

e(o+n-e)
dC

2

Cl -11) on ( e-o) w
e(e-n)(o+n- e) 2

> 0.

dK

= (0-n)- > 0.

ctr

ctr

dq

-(e-o)(l-11)w

dr

(o+n-0)(0-n)

-------When o = 1, the roots are e, e-n-o and 0-n.
and

dq
do

< 0.

In the unstable case,

dq
ctr

In the stable case, e-n-o < 0,

> 0.

Analogous to our derivation of equation (2) is the derivation of
dC(t)
do

dK
- di\
= i\.- - (K(t)-K)-.
ctr
do

Differentia ting the characteris tic polynomial, and evaluating the
derivative for r = 1 we get:
di\

ctr
The largest that

dC(t)
ctr

=

e(o+nCl-11))
o+n

> 0.

can be when r=l is when K(t) = 0.

irrespectiv e of the sign of i\. = e-n-o.

When K(t) = 0, we have

dC(t) = -[wo(n+e)
w(e+o)n(e-o )(l-11)]
+ - - - - - - - - < 0.
o+n
do
e (e-n) (o+n)
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This is true

Since

dC(t)
do

is negative at its maximum, it is always negative.

So, when the private marginal product of capital is lower, current
consumpti on is higher.

Saving is lower (because the change in O does not

affect the aggregate level of output), and capital accumulat ion is lower.

The

stable economy converges to a smaller capital stock and consumpti on level,
while the unstable economy grows continuou sly at a lower rate.

By following the same steps to derive equation (3), we can get
dq(t)
do

-

=

dq

0 (1-71)

-

--(K(t) -K).
0

This derivativ e is largest in either the convergen t or divergent case when
dq(t)
dq(t)
K(t) = 0. In that case,
= 0. When K(t) > 0,
> 0, except when 11 =
do

1 (in which case,

dq(t)

do

= 0).

do

Hence, a greater externali ty must increase q if 11 < 1.

That is simply

because the greater the externali ty, the higher the rents earned by equity
holders.

III.

Fiscal Policies

The Pigouvian subsidy to capital sets p = 0(1- 0 ).

This subsidy makes the

rental rate on capital, r, equal to the social opportuni ty cost of capital, 0.
When the Pigouvian subsidy is in place, the economy is at a Pareto optimum. 5

5 In this overlappi ng generatio ns model,
a dynamica lly inefficie nt
equilibriu m is not possible because of the linear technolog y.
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A.

Taxes and Deficits
The dynamic effects of a subsidy depend upon the exact way that the

governmen t finances the subsidy.

Options for the governmen t include borrowing

from the public, or raising non-disto rtionary taxes.

There are two types of

non-disto rtionary taxes available to the governmen t: lump-sum taxes on
consumers , or taxes on rents of the firms.
We will consider the following policy for non-disto rtionary taxes:
T(t) = ~K(t) + Z,
where Z is constant.

It is important to emphasize that even though the total

amount of taxes collected (or subsidies paid, if T(t) is negative) depends on
the aggregate capital stock, these taxes are levied as lump-sum taxes.
With this tax policy, the dynamic path for debt is given by:
D(t) = (p+re-n)D (t) + (p-~)K(t) -

z.

We will also assume that the amount of taxes levied on rents of firms,
P(t), is given by:
P(t) = a::K(t) +
where c is a constant.

C.

Recalling that T(t) = P(t) + T(t), the amount of lump

sum taxes levied on consumers , T(t), is given by:

We now have that the value of equities evolves according to:
q(t) = (p+r0-n)q (t) + (~-0(1-r) (l-~))K(t ) + c.
Define "financia l wealth", F(t), by F(t) s D(t) + q(t).

We have:

F(t) = (p+re-n)F (t) + (p+~-~-0 (1-r)(l-~) )K(t) + c-Z.
We have chosen the policies for non-disto rtionary taxes in a way that the
dynamics of the economy can be described with three state variables and three
dynamic equations .

As we shall see, this set of fiscal policies is special in
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the sense that it allows the government to arrive at any desired distributio n
of the external rents.
The dynamic system for the economy is:
cct)
(4)

KCt)
FCt)

=

p+ea-o

-on

-on

C(t)

-1

0-n

0

K(t)

p+a-~-0(1-a )Cl-~) p+er-n

0

F(t)

0

+

w
c-Z

We can now make the following observation about the economy when the
Pigouvian tax is imposed.

Observation 1:

When the Pigouvian tax, p = 0(1- 0 ), is imposed, and when

p+a-~-0(1- r)(l-~) = 0 and c-Z = 0, the path for aggregate consumption and
capital will be the same as the laissez-fai re economy with the same aggregate
production function and no externality ( 0=1).

Under the conditions stated in the observation , F(t) = 0 for all t.
Although q(t) and D(t) need not be zero, the paths of C(t) and K(t) are
independent of q and D, and are determined by:
C(t) = ce-o)C(t) - onKCt)
K(t) = -C(t) + (0-n)K(t) + w.
These are also the dynamic equations for the economy with no externality (so
the aggregate production function is given by 0K(t) + wL(t), which is
identical to the production function of the representat ive firm), and no
government interventio n.
We can also see from examination of equation (4) that the equations for
the evolution of consumption and the capital stock are not directly affected
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by the share of rents going to labor, ~. the parameter governing the behavior
of total non-distortionary taxes,~. or the parameter determining the share of
non-distortionary taxes that are levied on rents paid to firms, a.

We can

therefore state:

Observation

g:

A larger value of a or a smaller value of~ has the exact same

effect on the path for the economy as a smaller value of~-

This follows from examination of equation (4), noting that a, ~and~ appear
only as coefficients on K(t) in the equation for F(t).
smaller~ leads to the same behavior as a larger~-

A larger a or a

Because C, Kand Fare

state variables for this system, the specified changes in a, ~and~ have the
same effect on all variables in the economy.
The intuition of this result is as follows.

A greater value of a simply

implies that the rents for equity holders are being taxed at a greater rate.
This has the same effect as if the external rents accruing to owners of
equities in the laissez-faire economy were lower.
A greater value of~ implies that taxes are being shifted more toward
future generations.

The current debt of the government must be lower with the

government's solvency constraint imposed.

Since future generations bear more

of the tax burden, the currently alive are better off, just as if they were
receiving a greater share of external rents.
Tax collection policies that depend upon the aggregate capital stock
allow us to change the parameters the fiscal policies used, to mimic the
distributional effects of the external rents.

In contrast, changes inc and Z

cannot completely offset the effects of a change in~ on the dynamic system.
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B.

Dynamic Effects of Budgetary Policies

In this section, we will examine the effects of higher tax collections
and of shifting more of the tax burden on to owners of firms.
We will assume the Pigouvian subsidy is in place, so that p

=

0(1- 0 ).

All changes in lump-sum tax policies will not effect efficiency, only
intertemporal distribution.
We will also assume that c and Z are zero, so that total non
distortionary taxes are given by T(t) = ~K(t), and the amount of taxes imposed
on rents of firms is P(t) = aK(t).

We assume that a~ 0(1- 0 )(1-~), so that

after-tax rents are never negative.
We will compare two economies with different tax policies.
r

= a-~+8~(1- 0 ).

In the benchmark economy, r

= 0.

Define

In the comparison economy,

r is slightly less than 0, either because the economy collects more taxes in
total (higher~), or because the burden of taxes falls less heavily on owners
of firms (smaller a).
The dynamic system for the economy can be represented simply as:

cct)
ict)
fret)

=

e-o -on -on

C(t)

-1

8-n

O

K(t)

0

r

e-n

F(t)

The steady-state for the economy is given by:

(e-o) (e-n)w
K = ---------

S(o+n-8)(8-n)-ron
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0

+

w
0

C

=

F

=

[on(e-n)-fon]w
e(o+n-e)(e-n)-ron
-r(e-o)w
e(o+n-e)(e-n)-ron

We will consider how a change in r affects the dynamic path of the
economy.

That will allow us to compare the benchmark economy and the

comparison economy, assuming they have the same initial capital stock but
different tax policy parameters, a and~The effect of a change in r on the steady state (evaluating the
derivatives at r = 0) is given by:
dK

on(e-o) (e-n)w

ctr

[e(o+n-e) (e-n)] 2

----------

dC

dK

(0-n)-.
ctr

ctr

dq

-(e-a)w

d11

[e(o+n-e) (e-n)] 2

Analogous to equation (2) above, we have:
dC(t)
ctr

dK

ctr

To evaluate this expression for
(when

r = 0, A=

_ dA

A- - (K(t)-K)-.

ctr

dC(t)
df

e-o-n.), to get:
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dA

we calculate - evaluated at
ctr

r

= 0

=

ctr
Because

d;\.

ctr

> 0,

dC(t)

ctr

o+n

> 0.

is largest when K(t) is zero -- in either the

convergent or divergent case.

Then,

dC(t)

-(0+0)(0-o)nw

-ctr
---------

< 0.

2

(o+n)e (0-n)

dC(t)

So, even at its largest,

is negative.

ctr

We also have, following the derivation of (3), that
dF(t)

ctr

dF
a:

This derivative is largest when K(t)
dF ( t )

ctr

1

_

--(K(t)-K).

ctr o
a:

0.

In this case

- (0-o )w
;: - - - - < 0.
00(0-n)

We conclude that in the comparison economy with a lower value of r,
initial consumption and the initial value of financial assets are greater than
in the benchmark economy.
A lower value of

r

implies that a higher share of the tax burden will

fall on future generations, either because~ is greater or a is lower.

Thus,

the current generations are wealthier, which means that their consumption is
higher.

Saving in the economy will be lower.

with the lower value of

r

steady-state consumption.

In the stable case, the economy

will converge to a lower capital stock, and a lower
In the unstable case, the rate of growth of per

capita income,;\., will be lower.
If we let the benchmark economy be one where both debt and the value of
firms is zero (so~

a:

0(1-r) and a

a:

0(1-r)(l-~)), then if the benchmark

economy had a higher total tax rate (a higher~). it would also have a greater
25

initial debt.

So, if we compare two economie s with the same capital stock at

time t, the one that has been running larger budget deficits and has a higher
governm ent debt will have greater current consump tion.

However, in the stable

case its long-run capital stock and consump tion will be lower, and in both
cases, its growth rate will be lower.
Interest ingly, an economy which places a smaller share of the tax burden
on firm-ow ners, (a smaller a) will replicat e the consump tion and capital
accumul ation paths of the economy with higher initial debt and higher~ -

In

this case, the lower value of a will increase the value of firms, thus
encoura ging current consump tion and discoura ging saving.
Neither of the fiscal policies discusse d in this section are
distorti onary.

They,hav e no direct effects on factor supplies or factor

demands , nor do they alter current output.

Their effects are distribu tional.

But, by changing the distribu tion of income across generati ons, they change
the growth path.

IV.

Conclus ions

We have seen that the growth path of the economy depends on the size of
the externa lities generate d by capital and labor.

This is not surprisi ng.

It

is the basis for much of the analysis of the new growth theory.T he emphasi s of
this paper has been on the effects of the distribu tion of the rents generate d
by the externa lity.
We have construc ted an extreme ly simple example economy with an
investm ent externa lity typical of those in the new growth literatu re.

We see

that as a lower fraction of the rents are captured by workers, and more by
26

firm-owners , that current consumption will be greater, and saving will be
lower.

The growth rate will be lower and long-run output and consumption are

lower.
In the economy we study, a policy of subsidizing capital will lead to a
Pareto improvement in welfare.

But, the government may also be interested in

distributio nal policies which allow it to increase the value of social
welfare.

The fiscal policies that are chosen to achieve some desired

intergenera tional distribution of income or growth rate should depend on the
distributio n of rents.
The empirical importance of the distributio n effects is an open issue.
It should be possible to detect differences in the growth rates of economies
that have different rent distribution s, but we leave that to future research.
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